Primary Mission Outcomes

The main parties to the Nairobi Peace Talks were the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the faction of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLA) under the leadership of John Garang. The Peace Talks were held during May 4-6, 1998 under the chairmanship of the Honorable Dr. Bonaya Godana, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda were the official mediators. Individuals and those representing the friends of IGAD also mediated. I was invited to be one of the resource persons among the individuals who were recognized as mediators.

The role I played in the Nairobi Peace Talks is a continuation of my and my wife Julia’s efforts to facilitate communication and understanding among members of a society at war with itself. The role we play depends on the work we do and is defined by our reputation for consistency, integrity, and non-partisan influence building. As it has been during our previous facilitation and mediation efforts, my objective in Nairobi was to secure a durable state of peace in the Sudan. As a resource person, I adopted procedures of mediation that were both appropriate and acceptable to the parties involved.

Each day after the presentation of party positions and particular issues of concern, I moved to private meetings, talking to key negotiators individually. The choice of person to talk to depended first on the situation and second on the position of that individual in the negotiation. During the private meeting, I attempted to counteract the usual self-perpetuating patterns of belligerent and often violent interaction. This involved careful but firm wording, and sometimes pushing individuals to consider the consequences of refusing to negotiate. Often I tried to move the discussion forward by raising possibilities. This meant, for example, suggesting items to put on the table or items to trade.

In light of Julia’s and my experience and understanding of the conflict in the Sudan, of the people, their culture, and history, I stress that the Sudanese people need to be given a chance to propel their own social processes. President Moi of Kenya has constantly emphasized the primacy of the interest of the civil population of the Sudan in the IGAD's intervention. I see this mediation as a means to empower community members, further the goal of citizen participation, and set standards for responding to the current challenge of ethnic and culture dispute in the Sudan. I am not neutral with regard to the outcome of the Peace Talks, but I am non-partisan. I take into account the efficiency, stability, and wisdom of the outcome as measures of whether or not a workable agreement is in the making.

The agenda of the Nairobi Peace Talks included the following issues:

1. The right to self-determination for the people of southern Sudan

2. The relationship between State and Religion in the Sudan

3. The emergency relief needed in the southern Sudan

Referendum

After two days of negotiation, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement agreed on the recognition of the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. This right will be exercised through an internationally supervised referendum at the end of an interim period. The interim arrangement is to be negotiated and agreed upon by the two parties through the IGAD peace process. At one point the talks stalled over the definition of the region that would participate in the referendum. The GOS would recognize only the three southern provinces established at independence in 1956, Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. The SPLA wanted to include three additional provinces, Abiei, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. Further discussion was set aside and another round of IGAD sponsored talks scheduled for August 4-6, 1998 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (In Addis Ababa, the parties agreed to limit the referendum area to the three regions outlined in 1956.) Agreement on the referendum itself was a major achievement.

Religion

The war in the Sudan is often portrayed as a matter of religious differences. While that view is simplistic and misleading, it is true that factors contributing to the conflict have found expression in religious terms. Historically, the predominantly Muslim northern Sudan has perceived Sudan as a country of one people, divided by colonial powers. Since independence, northern policies have sought to "re-unite" the country through Arabization and Islamization. Southern groups oppose northern Sudan's attempts at forced unity and argue for either a separate southern state or a re-structuring of the national political system.

In the last decade, important realignments have blurred the traditional north-south character of the conflict. One adjustment brought a number of northern opposition parties into alliance with John Garang and the SPLA to overthrow the Government of Sudan by force. Another brought Riek Machar's United Democratic Salvation Front into a peace agreement and a joining of forces with the Government of Sudan. These changes have affected the dynamics of the civil war, but it remains unlikely that either side can resolve the long-standing conflict through force. A negotiated settlement is still the best hope for achieving peace. That settlement must offer at its very heart, freedom of religion for all citizens.

The parties in Nairobi were unable to reach a common ground on the question of the relationship between State and Religion, but declared their commitment to continue searching for an agreement.

Relief

On the question of the relief crisis in the southern Sudan, the parties agreed to facilitate the free and unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by famine. The GOS offered a cease-fire and immediate cessation of hostilities in order to facilitate the flow of relief supplies. The SPLA, however, was of the opinion that unhindered relief assistance to the needy should not be linked to a cease-fire. They hold that cease-fire, which they welcome in principle, is best negotiated as a separate issue.

During my time in Sudan, I visited the Upper Nile region. From what I could see, the commercial and social activities of the local people are gradually returning to their normal patterns. Farming on individual and collective tracts, trade among local and northern merchants, cattle camps, and road repairs were some of the evidence. Medical aid continues, but, in general, food aid is no longer needed.

In contrast, Bahr al-Ghazal region is experiencing famine. Most of this region is controlled by SPLA and has been dependent since 1989 on food dropped in by the United Nations' Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Citizens, held hostage in the concentration zones, are unable to move to other areas to get food and cannot plant or harvest in their permanent villages, as do their counterparts in the Upper Nile region. Tons of food supplies are dropped into the region, but according to a CNN news report published August 1998, "some relief goes to feed fighters." It is impossible to find out how much of the food ends up in rebel hands. One Sudanese pastor estimated that the amount could be as high as sixty-five percent. I believe lack of freedom, in addition to drought, is the major contributing factor to the deprivation. The Bahr el Ghazal famine underscores my strongly held view that the long-term objective of food aid must be to enhance the resourcefulness and freedom of the people, rather than to lead them into dependency.

Although it was not agreed at the Nairobi conference in May, John Garang did eventually permit a three-month cease-fire, allowing humanitarian and food aid to reach the population of Bahr el Ghazal. The horrors relief workers encountered have been well publicized by the Western press.

Secondary Mission Outcomes

The secondary purpose of my mission was to meet with leaders of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan. There were two reasons why it was necessary to meet President Museveni of Uganda and President Zenawi of Ethiopia. First, their assistance was needed to negotiate a cease-fire between the GOS and the SPLA. Second, they could help facilitate direct pre-talks between UDSF and SPLA, so that any outstanding issues could be resolved before the IGAD Talks resumed in August 1998.

My colleagues and I met with President Museveni two times. We discussed the need for him to persuade John Garang to accept calls for a cease-fire. As a result, President Museveni met with Garang and a cease-fire was later agreed upon. Unfortunately, I could not meet with President Zenawi due to the war that erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the fact that I returned to the United States before the August Addis Ababa Peace Talks began. My colleagues met President Zenawi in Addis Ababa and found him in support of the outcome mediated by the President of Uganda.

I also met twice with Sudan’s President al Bashir, twice with Dr. Turabi, and once with First Vice-President Ali Osman. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss problems associated with implementation of the Peace Agreement. From these Sudanese leaders I discerned a serious intent to implement the Agreement, including the referendum. This position is politically perilous, because the referendum holds the possibility that the south will decide to become a separate state. Many within the Government of Sudan are not willing to go that far. As Sudan’s future unfolds, it will take strong leadership to navigate the internal storms that lie ahead.

Looking to the Future

Future IGAD peace talks on the Sudan conflict will assist the Sudanese in negotiating the conditions of governance of the southern Sudan during the interim period and the conduct of the referendum. The resolution of the conflict in the Sudan depends on the third-party mediation of IGAD and regional and international bodies such as the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. The intervention of IGAD has been a blessing to the people of the southern Sudan and of the countries of the Horn. The two sides (basically north and south) could continue killing each other for years, as could their children and grandchildren, and nothing would be accomplished except great loss of life. With the mediation of IGAD, the two sides have jointly identified their differences and have worked out point-by-point resolutions. A major Sudan peace conference will be held in Nairobi early in 1999. The groundwork for a workable outcome has been well laid during talks such as the one I attended in Nairobi.

About South Sudanese Friends International

In 1993, Julia returned to southern Sudan after an absence of nearly ten years. She was appalled to see that the war of liberation had become a literal hell-on-earth for the grassroots people with no end in sight. She met that same year in Nairobi with each of the leaders of the southern rebel factions. They, in turn, invited me to help arrange a meeting between John Garang and Riek Machar in Washington, D.C. This was the beginning of Julia’s and my active non-partisan participation in the Sudan peace process.

In 1994 we founded South Sudanese Friends International (SSFI), a 501 (c) 3, non-profit corporation dedicated to finding long-term solutions to problems in the Sudan. Working to move the peace process forward is an important part of SSFI’s mission. Julia and I do this work at our own expense. Generous contributions from many churches and individuals have made our efforts possible. To these friends of Sudan, we are deeply grateful.

 

Home News Issues & ideas Projects How to help About us Photos Links Lens Contact us   SSFI's mission is to share the love of Jesus Christ with the people of southern Sudan  in a way that leads  them towards peaceful and self-reliant living from the grassroots level, so that available resources will meet the needs of their communities. Copyright (c) 1999 by SSFI. All rights reserved.